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To Hou Heneka and Continuous Change
Christopher Miras, Notre Dame University 
Presented to the SAGP at its December 2004 meeting 
with the Eastern Division o f the APA, Boston MA
Abstract: Beginning with Aristotle’s statement in Physics II.2 that motion must be continuous to be for the 
sake of an end, I argue that properly understood, continuity is actually a sufficient condition for the goal- 
directedness of any motion in Aristotle’s teleology. I establish this conclusion first for the simple motions 
discussed in Physics V-VI, and then for complex changes such as the generation and development of a 
living thing. In both steps of the argument, the notion of καθ’ αυτό agency serves as a key link between 
continuity and goal-directedness. The understanding of Aristotle’s teleology that emerges from the 
consideration of continuity, finally, fits Aristotle’s discussion of that for the sake of which in Generation 
and Corruption II.9 and Physics II.8.
In Physics 1.2,Aristotle introduces the cause for the sake of which—το ou 
ενεκα—in terms of three criteria. Something is an end if (a) it is last (έσχατον)—that is, 
is an outcome of some motion; (b) the motion in question is continuous; and (c) the 
outcome is, as he puts it, the best:
For with respect to things of which—the motion being continuous—there is some 
end. this last is also that for the sake of which. For this reason also the poet was 
carried away absurdly in saying, “he has death (τελευτήν), the very thing for the 
sake of which he came to be.” For not everything that is last claims to be an end, 
but the best (Phys.I.2, 194a29-33).'
In short, the good outcome of a continuous motion is an end and that for the sake of 
which. Although each of the criteria involved in this description calls for an extended 
discussion. I shall focus here on condition (b): συνεχούς της κινήσεως ουσης.1 2 More 
specifically, I argue in the following pages that this simple condition is in fact, by itself, a 
sufficient condition for goal-directedness. Striking as it may seem, this conclusion 
emerges from a careful analysis of Aristotle’s concept of continuity, particularly 
continuity in motion. In the course of this analysis we shall see that for Aristotle, a 
change is continuous if and only if it has, as a whole, a καθ’ αυτό agent cause. A καθ’ 
αύτό agent is one that tends by its nature to produce an outcome of a particular sort; when 
it does so, therefore, this outcome is an end.
My argument proceeds in two stages. In the first, I establish the connection 
between continuity and goal-directedness in the case of motion in the strictest sense: that 
is. for simple changes in quantity, quality or place. In the second, I show how continuity
1 Parallel texts are Phys. II.8, 199a8-9: “Further, in as many things as have some end, the first and the 
successive are done for the sake of this”; and PA 1.1, 641 b24-6: “We always say that this is for the sake of 
that, whenever there is clearly some end at which the motion concludes, should nothing stand in the way.” 
Similar statements can be found elsewhere (in Phys. II.3 and II.7, for example), but these three are the most 
complete.
For condition (a), see the discussion of Aristotle’s concept of limit (πέρας) in my forthcoming. On 
condition (c). see my also forthcoming.
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and so also goal-directedness are found in complex changes such the coming to be of a 
living thing.
With regard to the first point, I begin in section 1 by considering Aristotle’s 
discussion of continuous motion in Physics V. By the end of this section we shall have an 
initial argument that continuity is a sufficient condition for goal-directedness. In section 
2, I develop this connection between goal-directedness and continuity by considering 
Aristotle’s claim that motions are individuated in terms of continuity: that is, to be a 
single motion is nothing other than to be continuous. In this section, also, the concept of 
καθ’ αΰτό agency emerges as the essential link between continuity and goal-directedness.
However, because Aristotle’s discussion of motion in Physics V-VI is concerned 
only with simple motions, the scope of our conclusions in sections 1 and 2 will be 
somewhat limited. In section 3, therefore, moving on to texts from Generation and 
Corruption and Parts o f Animals, I show how the notion of continuity can be extended to 
include complex changes such as the coming to be of a living substance. In section 4 ,1 go 
on to examine the unity of these complex changes, and to show how this unity, 
established by the presence of a καθ’ αύτό agent cause, is the condition of their goal- 
directedness.
The view of Aristotle’s teleology that emerges in the following discussion finds 
additional support from many passages that I do not consider here. Two important texts 
to which I do refer, however, are Generation and Corruption II.9 and Physics II.8. In the 
former, Aristotle sets out to give an account of “how many and what are the principles of 
all coming to be alike” (335a26-7). Without intending to give a detailed interpretation of 
this account, I point out in section 2 the consonance between my conclusions in this paper 
and Aristotle’s remarks in Generation and Corruption concerning form as end. With 
regard to Physics II.8, I argue that on the interpretation of goal-directed motion 
developed below, the first two arguments of this well-known chapter can be read in a 
straightforward and highly plausible manner. Specifically, in sections 2 and 4 I consider 
the argument based on the occurrence of natural phenomena “always or for the most 
part,” and also in section 4 I discuss the analogy between nature and art.
I
To understand what Aristotle means by continuity in motion, we must return to 
his claim that every change is defined by limits. More precisely, as he explains in Physics 
V.l, the beginning and end of a given change may be opposed to each other either as 
contradictories or as contraries (224b28-9). Thus coming to be and passing away are 
defined by contradictories, whereas the limits of motion in the strict sense, in quality, in 
size, or in place, are contraries (225b7-9). Often, of course, such limits are not absolute 
contraries—the extremes in the genus to which they belong—but they are always at least 
relative contraries, through their differing proximity to these extremes (224b30-35). For 
example, not every change in color is from white to black or from black to white, but all 
such changes exhibit a basic structure that appears most clearly in motions involving 
these extremes.
Although Aristotle first mentions continuous motion in Physics III. 1 (200bl6- 
18), whose topic is motion in the broad sense, his eventual discussion of continuity in V.3
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depends on the distinction between change defined by contraries and that defined by 
contradictories. He first characterizes continuous motion as follows:
The last point (έσχατον) of the change is the contrary, and what the changing 
thing naturally arrives at, changing naturally and continuously, before it changes 
to what is last, is between. What is moved continuously (συνεχώς) is what leaves 
no gap (τό μηθεν ... διαλείπον), or the least possible, in the πράγμα—not in time 
(for nothing prevents things leaving a gap, and straightaway after the lowest the 
highest being sounded) but in the πράγμα in which it is moved (226b26-7, 23-5, 
27-31).3
For a motion to be continuous, then, there must be intermediates states between its 
beginning and its end. It is both significant and perplexing for our purposes, as we shall 
see later, that for coming to be and passing away tertium datur.
Since every change has to do with opposites (èv τοΓς άντικειμένοις), and the 
opposites are contraries and those by contradiction, and a contradiction has no 
middle, it is clear that what is between (το μεταξύ) is between contraries (βν τοΓς 
έναντίοις) (227a7-10).
The passage from non-being to being or from being to non-being is immediate; there are 
no intermediate states.
Let us examine this account of continuity more deeply, beginning with the 
observation that continuity in change, for Aristotle, depends on continuity in something 
he calls the πράγμα of a change. The term πράγμα is as flexible as our “thing,” and is 
likewise often used to denote the reality corresponding to a word or phrase. In this case, 
however, it refers to the generic attribute—color, for example—with respect to which 
something changes. In the case of motions, the πράγμα involves a continuum of possible 
attributes belonging to a common genus and bounded by a pair of contraries. Color, 
whose specific instances constitute a continuous spectrum limited by black and white, is 
one example. In the definition just quoted Aristotle uses pitch, which varies continuously 
between low and high. A third example, which turns out to be the most useful, is heat: In 
each case, however, continuity involves two things. First, the specific qualities between 
the extremes are arranged in succession (εφεξής) based on a progressively greater 
difference from one extreme, and similarity to the other. Second, any two successive 
parts of this range share a limit ( PhysicV.3, 227a6, 10-12).
A continuous motion, then, is one that leaves no gap (or the least possible) in the 
πράγμα defined by the limits of that motion. As we have already observed, however, in 
the case of a change defined by contradictories there is no such πράγμα. The two possible 
states are being and non-being; like an electric light with no dimmer switch, there is no 
intermediate between off and on. Continuity, therefore, as Aristotle defines it in Physics 
V.3. does not apply to coming to be and passing away. This conclusion presents an 
obvious problem for the description of goal-directed motion in Physics II.2. On the one 
hand, the most obvious and impressive case of change for the sake of an end is the 
coming to be of living things; on the other, such change, understood as coming to be, 
cannot be continuous in the strict sense. Later, we shall resolve this difficulty by finding
’ Lines 226b23-227al0 of this chapter retain Bekker’s numbering, but the passage was reconstructed by 
Ross for the OCT edition as follows: 226b23, 227a7-10, 226b26-7, 226b23-5, 226b27-35, 227al-6, 
227al0.
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in other texts a broader sense of the term συνεχής. At the moment, however, the strict 
sense of continuity raises another interesting challenge: the claim, now seemingly 
implicit in Physics II.2, that even so basic a motion as becoming hot, provided that it take 
places continuously and that the outcome be good, is for the sake of that outcome.
To pursue this suggestion and its implications, we must first consider more 
carefully the relation between motions and their πράγματα. For as Aristotle’s point about 
low and high notes makes clear, the right sort of πράγμα is a necessary but insufficient 
condition of continuity in motion. Only if the successive stages of the motion correspond 
to those of the πράγμα—if, as Aristotle puts it, the subject passes from one contrary to 
the other without skipping anything in between—will the motion be continuous. 
Metaphysically, this means that for any two successive stages of the change, the είδος 
that defines the earlier defines the later as well, serving as both that to which and that 
from which. In an actually continuous motion, of course, such stages are only potentially 
distinct, and the είδος that defines them does not actually serve as a limit. An actual pause 
in time, as Aristotle later points out, would destroy the continuity even without any jump 
in the πράγμα (V.4, 228b3-7).
Moreover, although Aristotle chooses as his example an instance of change in which 
discontinuity is possible—think of the flautist who plays one note immediately after 
another—there are other motions in which discontinuity of this sort seems to be excluded. 
Motions of this sort are, as we shall see, by far the most interesting, and may well include 
all causally basic motions in Aristotle’s cosmos.4 To take an example, we may assume— 
in the absence of any evidence that Aristotle had a quantum theory of heat—that an 
Aristotelian body can become hot only by a continuous motion from its beginning 
relative coldness. As with any continuous motion, therefore, the heated body passes 
through infinitely many intermediate degrees of heat, each one of which is a potential 
endpoint. If the motion is necessarily continuous, then the attainment of every such 
potential limit is a prerequisite to the attainment of the actual endpoint. The motion is 
cumulative in such a way that each degree of heat is necessary for reaching the next.
There is a bit more to be said about continuity in Physics V, but we have enough 
already to consider its relevance to Aristotle’s teleology. As already observed, it follows 
from Physics II.2 and Physics V.3-4, taken together, that even the simplest continuous 
motion is for the sake of its outcome—provided, as II.2 adds, that this outcome be good. 
To press the importance of continuity even further, however, I want to consider before 
proceeding some evidence that the condition of goodness is—though perfectly correct on
4 For example, Aristotle’s account of sound commits him to the claim that changes in pitch are 
causally dependent on changes in the mechanical means by which air is set in motion, such as the fingers of 
a flautist or the vocal chords of a singer (see DA 11.8). Furthermore, Aristotle analyzes all changes of this 
latter sort in terms of heating, cooling, and locomotion. Finally, it is hard to read Phys. and without 
concluding that changes of these last three sorts are necessarily continuous. Thus, it turns out that a 
discontinuous change in pitch is causally dependent on continuous changes in temperature and in place. 
More generally, a careful reading of GC suggests, to me at least, that all bodily changes in Aristotle’s 
cosmos (where bodily changes are those not depending intrinsically on soul) should be analyzed in terms of 
locomotion, heating and cooling. This would mean that all causally basic changes are necessarily 
continuous. This conclusion would be a significant one for what follows, for if a motion only happens to be 
continuous, it is doubtful that its earlier stages are hypothetically necessary for what follows. This would, 
of course, weaken or even refute the claim that the earlier stages are for the sake of the later and of the 
outcome.
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Aristotle’s view—superfluous. In Physics II.2, Aristotle begins by claiming that every 
outcome of a continuous motion is an end. Only after reporting the poet’s “absurd” 
mistake does he add that this outcome must be good. Now although we have not yet 
discussed the sense in which an animal’s development counts as a continuous change, let 
us assume for the moment, quite reasonably, that its decline to death is not in any relevant 
sense continuous with its development to maturity. One follows the other, and that is all. 
This would mean, however, that the continuity condition already excludes the poet’s 
mistake. This argument may not be enough to show that goodness is not a distinct 
necessary condition for goal-directedness. At the same time, to catch the poet out with the 
continuity condition alone would be suggestive—and would make continuity rather more 
important than it would otherwise be.5
The claim I shall now try to defend, therefore, is a strong one: on Aristotle’s 
account, continuity by itself ensures that a motion is for the sake of its outcome, and thus 
simultaneously ensures that the outcome is good. To begin motivating this claim, I want 
to consider as a possible counterexample the recently described process of heating. 
Surely, after all, we have no reason to think that the particular degree of heat at which 
this process ends is good for its subject. In fact. Generation and Corruption tells us that 
depending on the nature of the body and the degree of heat, the heated body may actually 
be destroyed. In this case, we would have a continuous change that results in the 
destruction of its subject, rather than its good. The heat that brings about such destruction 
is decidedly bad for the substance destroyed, and previous degrees of heat would thus 
seem to be neutral at best.
There is, however, a problem with this counterexample as stated. The above 
account of destructive heating fails to note that on Aristotle’s account of change, heating 
is the actuality not only of the body heated but also of the agent that heats it ( . III.3,
202al3-21). Moreover, although the immediate agent may simply be transmitting heat, 
such a process always involves a primary agent that is hot by nature. Such an agent may 
act indiscriminately, and so incidentally destroy what it heats, but the heat it confers is 
nevertheless the outcome of its natural activity, its epyov. For Aristotle, however, both 
actuality and that for the sake of which coincide with goodness, and so the identification 
of heat as the result of a substance’s natural activity is enough to qualify it as good.6
One is tempted to respond, of course, that compared with Aristotle’s clearest 
examples of goodness in the natural world, namely, living things, calling heat good is at 
best rather trivial. This appearance of triviality is not damning, however, for it 
corresponds in Aristotle’s metaphysics to a limitation in the sort of goodness something 
like heat can have. We have already seen that goodness, for Aristotle, is an aspect of 
actuality, and that actuality corresponds to form and to the activities that flow therefrom. 
Thus, to return for a moment to the hierarchy of form and function in Meteorology IV. 12,
' We already know that Aristotle considers the good, by its very nature, an end. Although we have not yet 
mentioned spontaneity and chance, let me now introduce them by suggesting that if the good is by its 
nature an end, a good outcome can fail to be that for the sake of which only if it comes about κατά 
συμβεβεκός.
6 For Aristotle’s concept of goodness see my work elsewhere. It is worth noting here, however, that as soon 
as we think of the outcome of any change as an achievement of the agent rather than as a πάθος of the 
patient, there seems to be an intuitive sense in which we can characterize it as good.
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it follows that both the degree of goodness associated with a given form, as well as the 
intuitive or non-intuitive character of attributing goodness to that form at all, will depend 
on its place in the hierarchy. In short, both the difficulty we may find in attributing 
goodness to heat, and the possibility of making this attribution plausible, are predicted by 
Aristotle’s account of goodness.
In addition to heat’s low place in the hierarchy of form, the heat in our example 
has another handicap from the evaluative point of view. Although such heat is the result 
of a natural capacity, and for this reason can be thought of as an achievement, this 
achievement is not directed so as to be “good for” anything. As Aristotle points out in 
Metaphysics Θ.2, capacities not accompanied by reason act necessarily on any receptive 
substance with which they come into contact. Thus, as we have seen, the heat that 
corresponds to an agent’s nature may be irrelevant to or even destructive of the patient. 
Only by chance—in the absence of some more comprehensive principle of order—might 
it turn out to be good. Perhaps for this reason, Aristotle recognizes a sense of δύναμνς 
which he actually contrasts with nature: whereas nature (φύσις) is a substance’s capacity 
to act on itself, δύναμις is the capacity to act on another or on oneself as other (
Θ.9, 1049b5-10). The existence of natures thus constitutes the most basic way in which a 
substance’s capacity to act can be directed toward an effect that is good in a stronger 
sense: it is good for—in the sense of preserving or bringing to perfection—the agent 
itself.
In fact, however, despite these limitations, the heat in our example is not purely 
random. The capacity to heat is, by definition, for the sake of heating, and heating is for 
the sake of heat. If, therefore, an agent possesses the capacity to heat by nature, then 
heating fulfills an aspect of its nature. This heating is, in its own way, an ordered activity; 
it proceeds gradually toward a limit set by the capacities of the agent and the patient and 
by the immediacy of their contact. This minimal goal-directedness is not diminished by 
the fact that the activity is in other respects random and imperfect—less perfect even than 
the activity fire exhibits in feeding and sustaining itself on whatever lies at hand, and far 
less perfect than the unchanging, self-sufficient identity of thinker and thought which all 
goal-directed activity—especially activity aiming at self-preservation—tries to imitate.
II
In considering what is involved in one body’s heating another, we have developed 
a plausible argument to the effect that every continuous motion is for the sake of its 
outcome, an outcome that therefore has at least a minimal goodness. We have by no 
means exhausted, however, the various dimensions of the connection between continuity 
and goal-directedness. The next step in our investigation begins when we notice that in 
the chapter following his discussion of continuity in motion, Aristotle argues that to be 
continuous and to be numerically the same motion (to be unqualifiedly one) are 
equivalent. In doing so, he adds two requirements for strict continuity, over and above 
that of not skipping any portion of the πράγμα. The first is that the motion be specifically 
the same in all its parts—that is, it must involve only a single πράγμα, defined by a single 
pair of contraries. The second requirement is that the motion be accomplished without 
pause, in a single continuous time. Now although he relies on the intuitive plausibility of 
these criteria to justify their place in his account of motion, the thesis that every
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continuous motion is for the sake of its outcome suggests that further reflection is in 
order. For if this thesis is correct, then we should expect each aspect of unqualified unity 
to be necessary in order to guarantee the teleological character of an apparently 
continuous motion.
In fact, a more detailed consideration of the various components of unity reveals a 
point-by-point correspondence between the components of unity and the various ways a 
motion might fail to be for the sake of its outcome. Consider, for example, a change 
whose analysis reveals two πράγματα, defined by two pairs of contraries. Such a change 
would actually consist of two successive or overlapping motions, which might only 
happen to occur together. In this case, even if the first change were to bring about the 
starting point for the second, it would do so incidentally, and not for the sake of the 
second and its outcome. Or, consider a change that involves a single pair of contraries but 
skips part of what lies between them. In such a change, likewise, the immediate outcome 
of the earlier stages may be related only incidentally to the later stages. Third, even 
without such a jump, a gap in time between the earlier and later stages may well indicate 
that the agent cause of the earlier stages was not aiming at the later stages when causing 
the earlier, but simply at the outcome of the earlier. A final case of discontinuity, which 
Aristotle does not mention in Physics V.4, would be an apparently continuous change 
that is in fact caused by two agents, one picking up at the exact moment when the other 
leaves off. Even without a gap in time, causal discontinuity of this sort means that the 
change need not be goal-directed as a whole. If, for example, the second agent carries the 
process farther than the first agent could have done, the first agent was obviously not 
acting for the sake of the outcome produced by the second. Once again, the motion as a 
whole would fail to be for the sake of its result.
In considering the relation between continuity and goal-directedness in motion, I 
have slipped in an aspect of motion that Aristotle does not mention in Physics V.3-4, but 
that is essential to his analysis as a whole. This is, of course, the fact that motion is the 
actuality of its agent cause as well as that of its subject. Although this added perspective 
has been necessary to uphold the thesis that every continuous motion is for the sake of its 
outcome, I think it can also justified independently of this thesis. First, if we return to 
Physics V. 1 it is clear that the mover is an essential part of the analysis of any motion. 
Second, the definition of motion in Physics III. 1-3 makes it clear that every motion, 
despite being a single reality existing in its subject, nevertheless pertains causally to both 
the agent and the patient. Therefore, we may safely assume that the individuation—and 
therefore the continuity—of motions must involve the agent as well as the patient.
In any case, it is clear enough that continuity from the patient’s point of view is 
not sufficient to guarantee goal-directedness. This point has already emerged, to some 
degree, from our discussion of heating as a goal-directed action. There I pointed out that 
in a cumulative change such as heating, the earlier stages are necessary for the later. Now 
if such a change is goal-directed, then this necessity turns out to be nothing other than 
Aristotle’s well-known hypothetical necessity. What first made the claim that heating is 
goal-directed plausible, however, was not simply its status as a cumulative change, but 
the fact that it is the actualization of a natural capacity of some agent. Moreover, it is now 
clear that being cumulative only guarantees one aspect of complete continuity: a 
cumulative change might include more than one πράγμα, and it might not take place in a
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continuous time. Both of these possibilities, as we have seen, are significant because they 
reveal various ways, not all of them teleological, in which a given outcome can occur.
We will grasp more clearly the importance of the agent in goal-directed change if 
we reflect further on hypothetical necessity and the necessity involved in a cumulative 
change. For Aristotle, as the discussions to which I have already referred make clear (see 
Phys. II.9, PA II. 1), hypothetical necessity is part of an important mode of explanation in 
natural science. Because each form can only exist in matter appropriate to it, the 
supposition (ύπόθεσις) that a given form is to be carries necessary consequences for the 
structure, materials, and coming to be of the matter whose form it is. In the simple case 
that we have been considering, a given degree of heat can be produced only in a body that 
has already been heated to nearly that degree. What makes this type of necessity 
explanatory, however, is not simply the dependence of form on matter, but the 
supposition that the form is to be. Without this supposition, as Aristotle frequently points 
out, nothing is explained. When a motion fails to be continuous (or unqualifiedly one) in 
one of the ways mentioned above, however, the merely incidental connection between the 
earlier and later stages of the motion makes the ultimate outcome irrelevant to explaining 
the first part of the motion. Any supposition of the end would be purely arbitrary, and so 
the hypothetical necessity fails to be explanatory.
In the last analysis, therefore, the continuity or unity of motion required if an 
action is to be for the sake of the end depends on the way in which the outcome of the 
motion, and therefore also its various stages, come about. More specifically, a motion 
will turn out to be continuous in the relevant sense if and only if (a) it is caused by an 
agent whose natural effect is the outcome of the whole motion, and (b) this agent in fact 
causes the various stages of the motion as stages in the production of this outcome. In the 
case of heating, the natural activity of the agent is to bring about the maximum heat that it 
can produce, and that the body on which it is acting can receive. Any intermediate degree 
of heat that such an agent produces is, as a matter of fact, produced on the way to this 
maximum, because no intermediate degree corresponds fully to the natural capacity of 
the agent relative to the patient. On the other hand, if the agent’s activity happens to be 
interrupted before it reaches its natural goal, then, in accord with Aristotle’s analysis of 
contraries, the degree of heat actually achieved will serve as a surrogate endpoint for the 
change. Despite having failed to reach its natural goal, the process of heating will still 
have been directed toward that goal.
Earlier, I stated that Aristotle’s notion of καθ’ αυτό agent causality serves as a key 
link between continuity and goal-directedness. By considering continuity from the 
perspective of the agent, we can see how this is the case. Fully understood, the continuity 
condition ensures that a given change is directed by the source of that change, the agent, 
toward a predetermined outcome. In Aristotle’s terminology, this correlation between a 
change’s specific outcome and the specific active potentiality of its cause is a καθ’ αύτό 
causal connection. As we have just seen, moreover, the existence of such a connection 
entails that the intervening change is for the sake of an end. If we add to this picture the 
account of spontaneity and change in Physics II .4-6, it follows conversely that absent any 
καθ’ αύτό connection—that is, when an agent acts κατά συμβεβεκός—the outcome is not 
an end, but rather a result of spontaneity or chance.
The alternative between καθ’ αύτό agency for the sake of an end, on the one hand, 
and κατά συμβεβεκός agency leading to a chance outcome, on the other, is one that
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Aristotle himself proposes in his most important discussion of natural teleology, in 
Physics II. 8. It serves as a premise in his first argument there that nature acts for an end, 
although the conditional form in which he states the premise has left it uncertain whether 
he actually accepts it. The continuity condition of Physics II.2, however gives us an 
independent reason to take the alternative quite seriously: εΐ ouv από συμπτώματος 
δοκεΓ ή ένεκά του εΓναι (“so if it seems to be either spontaneous or for the sake of 
something”: 199a3-4). Later, in section 4 ,1 shall return to this argument and also briefly 
consider the analogy between art and nature that follows it in Physics II. 8. It is already 
significant, however that our discussion thus far supports a straightforward reading of 
Aristotle’s preferred argument that nature acts for an end.
Thus for the simple motions considered in Physics V-VI, Aristotle’s continuity 
condition and the accompanying requirement of καθ’ αυτό agency guarantee goal- 
directedness. At the same time, simple motions like heating are far from Aristotle’s 
favorite cases of goal-directed change, namely, the coming to be of living substances. 
Moreover, because such complex changes involve really distinct stages, not to mention 
the coming to be of a new substance, they do not seem to fit the definition of continuity 
provided in Physics V. To understand Aristotle’s favorite example of goal-directedness, 
therefore, we need to see how he conceives of the unity and continuity of complex 
changes. However, before going on it may be helpful to review what we have 
accomplished already.
Drawing on the account of continuity in Physics V.3-4, I have argued that the 
continuity condition of Physics II.2 should be taken quite seriously—indeed, that 
continuity itself is a sufficient condition for goal-directedness in motion. To summarize 
the argument briefly, the outcome of every continuous motion is the actuality and 
defining limit of a natural capacity of the agent responsible for that motion, or at least an 
approximation of that limit. In such a motion, each successive stage is hypothetically 
necessary for, and is in fact brought about on the way to, the limit that defines the motion 
as a whole. In short, the continuity condition ensures that an outcome of change is 
actually playing, in the entire process that leads up to it, the causal role designated by the 
phrase το ου ένεκα.
It is worth noting that in addition to explicating the continuity requirement, the 
account of το ου ένεκα that I have just given corresponds perfectly to Aristotle’s account 
in Generation and Corruption II.9 of “how many and what are the principles of all 
coming to be alike” (335a26-7). According to this discussion, the principles in question 
are the form that comes to be, the matter in which it comes to be, and the agent that 
brings it to be. In this same chapter, moreover, criticizing the early naturalists’ over­
reliance on the material cause, Aristotle observes that agent and form are correlative 
causal principles: agency, on his account, consists in transmitting to matter a form to 
which that matter is in potency, but which it cannot give itself (see also Metaph. Z.7-8). 
In the terms of the foregoing discussion, the form that comes to be is the defining limit of 
the agent’s capacity to bring it to be, and it is this that qualifies it as an end and that for 
the sake of which.
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III
The question that we must now confront, however, is this: given that the 
generation and development of an animal or plant consists of many actually distinct 
stages, and involves the coming to be of a new substance, in what sense can be 
considered a continuous change? If the above discussion of simple motions is any guide, 
we are looking for a sense of continuity that that entails the unity of the process in 
question under the direction of a καθ’ αυτό agent. Moreover, despite its general silence on 
the subject of complex changes, Physics V.4 does suggest how we should think about this 
unity, pointing out a second sense in which we may call a motion one:
Further, we also call one a motion that is complete, whether in genus, whether in 
species, or whether in ουσία, just as also in other things the complete and the 
whole pertain to what is one. But sometimes an incomplete motion may be called 
one, if only it be continuous ( Phys.V.4, 228bl 1-15).
Aristotle’s reference to “the complete and the whole” in these lines is of obvious interest. 
Before discussing the unity of complex changes directly, however, let us prepare the 
ground by considering how he uses the term “continuous” to characterize changes that 
are not continuous motions in the strict sense of Physics V.3-4.
To set the context for our remarks on this topic, it will be helpful to consider briefly the 
curious ontological status of the process by which a natural substance comes to be. On 
the one hand, the generation and development of an animal is clearly not the sort of 
change Aristotle has in mind when he considers the properties of motion in Physics V- 
VI: it is not an incidental change in an independently existing substance. On the other 
hand, neither is it simply a case of coming to be in the sense of Physics V .l-3, for rather 
than an immediate passage from non-being to being, it is an extended process including 
both the coming to be and the development to maturity of a new substance. As Sarah 
Broadie has observed, however, coming to be in this sense does fit the broad definition of 
motion that Aristotle develops in Physics III. 1-3.7 In formulating this definition he is 
concerned with processes of all sorts, from jumping to house-building (cf. III. I, 201al8- 
9). We have already considered the simple processes that fit his definition; our task now 
is to deal with those that are more complex.
Although complex κινήσεις do not have the sort of continuity or unity that 
Aristotle explicitly discusses in Physics V.3-4,1 shall argue that the concept of continuity 
articulated in these chapters can nevertheless be extended to some of complex 
processes—and in particular, to the coming to be of living substances—in such a way 
that continuity remains a sufficient condition for the goal-directedness of any change. 
More specifically, building on Aristotle’s own use of the term συνεχής to describe 
complex processes, I show in the present section that such processes can verify the two 
conditions for continuity in general prescribed in Physics V.3, even if they do not meet 
the following chapter’s requirements for strict continuity in motion. In section 4, this 
broad notion of continuity will enable us to develop an the idea of a change that is not 
simply complex, but constructive. Despite its lack of simplicity, a constructive change
7 Sarah (Waterlow) Broadie, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle 's Physics: A Philosophical Study 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 95-6.
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can nevertheless have a unity of completeness or wholeness, the sort mentioned in the 
lines from Physics V.4 quoted above. This unity, like that of simple motions, corresponds 
to the operation of a καθ’ αυτό agent, and thus ensures that the constructive change is 
goal-directed.
A good starting point for extending the notion of continuous change is a passage 
in Generation and Corruption 1.2 in which Aristotle contrasts coming to be and passing 
away with alteration:
There is unqualified coming to be and passing away ... whenever it changes from 
this to that as a whole.... For in the subject there is something as account (κατά 
τον λόγον) and something as matter (κατά την ύλην). Whenever, therefore, the 
change is in these, it will be coming to be or passing away; whenever in the 
affections and what is incidental (κατά συμβεβεκός), altération (317a20-26).8 
In the following chapter, Aristotle goes on to point out that “we do not say that what 
learns comes to be unqualifiedly, but that it comes to be knowing, whereas what grows 
comes to be” (319a9-l 1). Together, these two statements help us to formulate a succinct 
Aristotelian description of a living substance’s development: In the process of 
development, a living thing comes to possess in actuality attributes that are essential to 
the kind of thing it is (το κατά τον λόγον), at the same time as its bodily structure (το κατά 
την ύλην) develops to support these attributes.
On this account, development is not simply a series of secondary modifications a 
living substance, but a genuine case of coming to be. At the same time, as just mentioned 
with regard to Physics III. 1-3, it strongly analogous to motion in the narrower sense. As 
in the case of heating, for example, in a living thing’s development a form comes to be in 
appropriate matter over a period of time, in such a way that the earlier stages of this 
process are hypothetically necessary for the later stages and for the final outcome. The 
difference in the case of unqualified coming to be is that the form acquired is not a 
secondary or incidental attribute of an already existing substance; it is, rather, the very 
οΰσία of the composite that it constitutes together with its subject. This is also, no doubt, 
why Aristotle insists in Generation and Corruption 1.2 that in unqualified coming to be, 
the change is not only in the form but also in the matter, which especially in the case of 
living things comes to be as it is only for the sake of the form.9
Not surprisingly, given Aristotle’s recurring cosmological concerns in Generation 
and Corruption, it is in same work that we find his most interesting uses of the term
συνεχής and its cognates that depart from the strict sense of Physics V.3—4. Aristotle sets 
the context for this looser sense of continuity early in book I, when he concludes that 
coming to be is ceaseless (απαυστον) because the passing away of one thing is always the 
coming to be of another ( GC 1.3, 318a24-6). Much later, toward the end of the work, this 
basic observation sets up an important conclusion regarding the cyclical transformation 
of the elements: “Hence motion in a straight line, imitating that in a circle, is also 
continuous (συνεχής)” (II. 10, 337a8). Shortly after, he expands on the relevant notion of
8 See also GC 1.5: “In unqualified coming to be or passing away a thing does not remain (ούχ υπομένει), 
whereas in alteration, increase and decrease the thing increased or altered remains the same, but in one the 
affection, in the other the size does not remain the same” (321a22-5).
9 See also DA II. 1, 412b25-27, where Aristotle claims that in the case of living things the proximate matter 
neither precedes nor outlasts the existence of the composite.
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continuity: “in things moved continuously—coming to be or altering or, in general, 
changing—we see a succession, and this coming to be after this so as not to leave a gap 
(ώστε μη διαλείπειν)” (II. 11, 337a34-b2). The last phrase is generally translated into 
some such phrase as, “in such a way that there is no cessation.”10 However, Aristotle is 
here analyzing the causal structure of continuous change, and he is quite clear that 
continuity in time is parasitic on continuity in the change itself (II. 10, 337a23-6). The 
relevant point, therefore—as the rest of II. 11 amply confirms—is not simply that no time 
elapses between one change and another, but that the each change is made possible by the 
one that precedes it: the changes are causally, and not merely temporally successive, in 
such a way that each follows immediately upon the last.
In this chapter, the last of Generation and Corruption, Aristotle is concerned with 
the causal structure of the continuous change he finds in the cosmos; in particular, he 
wants to establish that continual coming to be is necessary. This means moving from the 
claim that each step in a continuous series of changes presupposes the previous, to the 
claim that the later step follows necessarily upon the earlier. Because an agent can always 
be impeded from acting, moreover, Aristotle does not think that the causal ability of the 
successive agents is sufficient to establish the necessity he wants (337b3-10; cf. Metaph. 
E.2-3 ). He therefore finds the grounds of necessity in the fact that the actually existing 
sequence of agents, both in the coming to be of the elements and in that of living things, 
follows a circular pattern. Starting with any point in the cycle, then, we can identify a 
goal-directed agency sufficient for supposing the recurrence—not with strict necessity, 
but at least èniτο πολύ—of the same state at a later time. Given this supposition, in turn, 
everything in between must first come to be. Aristotle concludes that despite the lack of 
strict necessity from the point of view of agency, the causal structure of the continuous 
coming to be that we actually observe is sufficiently stable that the structure itself, unlike 
the individual events that constitute it, is necessary.
The causal structure in which Aristotle locates the necessity of eternal coming to be is, 
with one significant difference, the same structure that characterized as teleological the 
simple instance of heating that we considered above. The difference is, moreover, 
precisely the fact that heating, as we considered it above, does not involve the kind of 
reflexivity that according to Aristotle characterizes natural activity in the full sense, and 
that also, despite important differences, grounds the eternal necessity of coming to be in 
the sublunary sphere. Heating is a directed, constructive change from the agent’s point of 
view; but taken by itself, it falls far short of the ordered self-maintenance that 
characterizes the natural world as a whole. However, it is the similarities that now 
concern us. In discussing strictly continuous motion, we ended up identifying a basic 
causal structure that accounts for the teleological character of such motions. In the 
supposition of an end, grounded in the existence of a competent agent and itself 
grounding the necessity of what the end presupposes, we have now found the same causal
10 See for example E. S. Forster, trans., “Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away,” in Aristotle III: Sophistical 
Refutations, Coming-To-Be and Passing-Away, The Cosmos, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 400 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), 320; Η. H. Joachim, trans., “On Generation and Corruption,” in 
The Complete Works o f  Aristotle: The Revised Oxford , ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press), 2:552.
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structure in continuous coming to be. This brings us an important step closer to 
specifying what it means for coming to be to be continuous.
Before raising this question directly, however, it is worth noting that there are 
several passages in which continuity of the kind we are now considering is explicitly 
linked with being for the sake of an end. They are parallels—in the same or slightly 
different terminology—of the text from Physics II.2, but unlike this text they emphasize 
the fact that an end may be reached through an ordered series of steps. Consider the 
following three:
Further, in as many things as have some end, the first and the successive are done 
(πράττεται δ’ το πρότερον κα i το ¿φέξης) for the sake of this (Phys. II.8, 199a8-9).
For by nature are whatever, being moved continuously (συνεχώς) from some 
principle within themselves, arrive at some end: and from each not the same for 
all, nor just anything (ούδε το τυχόν), but it would always tend to the same, if 
nothing impeded” (Phys.I .8 199M6-7).11
Matter of just such a sort must be present if a house or another such end is to be; 
and this first, then that, must come to be and be moved, and indeed in just this 
way, successively, up to (¿φέξης μέχρι) the end and that for the sake of which 
each thing comes to be and is. So also in what come to be by nature 1.1, 
639b26-640al).
With these passages in mind, we can now ask what, in the context of coming to be, 
Aristotle means by the term συνεχώς.
First, it is interesting to note that in the passage just quoted from Parts o f Animals 
and in the first of those from Physics II.8, Aristotle uses the technically weaker term 
¿φέξης just as he elsewhere uses συνεχώς. As noted in section 1, for two things to be 
¿φέξης, or successive, is the first of two conditions for continuity, the second being that 
they have a common limit. In the text from Parts o f Animals, moreover, ¿φέξης occurs in 
a description reminiscent of the negative phrase μη διαλείπειν, which we saw applied to 
coming to be in Generation and Corruption II. 11. In each text, the underlying cluster of 
concepts is the same: In describing a complex process, each step in which is 
hypothetically necessary for a given end, Aristotle, uses terms such as μη διαλείπειν, 
¿φέξης, and συνεχώς to indicate the relation between any step and that which must take 
place immediately before it. Let us reflect briefly on these terms.
First, recall that in Physics V.3, the terms ¿φέξης and μη διαλείπειν express 
Aristotle’s requirement that a continuous change cover the entire πράγμα defined by its 
limits. In considering this requirement, we discovered that for certain cumulative 
changes, at least, it is part of the stronger, causal continuity necessary for the goal- 
directedness of simple changes. What, then, do these terms express when it comes to the 
more complex changes that we are now considering? Beginning with ¿φέξης, suppose 
that for a given step B to occur presupposes the occurrence of step Now states A and B
" This passage, although not obviously relevant from the text itself, has to do in context with the 
development of living things from their respective seeds.
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will be successive, in the causal sense that Aristotle needs, if and only if no intervening 
step C is involved in B's following from A. In other words, A must be a sufficient, and 
not merely a necessary condition for B. If, conversely, A were not sufficient for B, then B 
could only follow from A by way of C, in which case A and B would not be successive. 
The phrase μη διαλείπειν expresses a closely related point. Literally, it excludes any gap 
in process, whether temporal or simply causal. For instance, suppose that although B 
follows immediately upon A in time, it is in fact caused not by A but by C, which is 
causally unrelated to A. In this case there is a causal gap in the temporally continuous 
process leading from A to B, and so we do not have a significant case of continuous 
motion. In the change as a whole, the stages up to and including A would be related only 
incidentally to the stages following A and thus to the end.
What, then, of συνεχώς? We are now in a position to say exactly to what extent 
Aristotle’s account of continuity in motion applies to continuous coming to be; moreover, 
the answer turns out to be surprisingly straightforward. The two share exactly what is 
signified by the adjective “continuous” when taken by itself, apart from either 
substantive. Continuity in general, as Aristotle defines it in Physics V.3, is present when 
successive things of whatever sort—place, time, motion, and so forth—share a limit. Not 
only in simple motions, however, but in complex continuous changes as well, causally 
successive steps do in fact share a limit. To see this, let us return to our first example, in 
which step A in a complex process is a sufficient condition for B. This can only be the
case if the possibility of B is immediately contained in the actuality of A, so that as soon 
as A occurs, B will follow. In fact, Aristotle explicitly discusses this sort of immediate 
possibility in Metaphysics Θ.5 and 7, one conclusion of which is that strictly speaking, 
we call something possible only when nothing further is necessary for it to come about, 
so that if nothing interferes it will, in fact, occur. In short, although it would be incorrect 
to say that the potentiality for step B is identical to the actuality of A, it is nevertheless 
contained within it, so that the limit-to-which of coming to be is the limit-from-which 
of 5 ’s coming to be. This is what it means to say that two steps in a complex change are 
continuous.
IV
It is now clear enough that natural coming to be is continuous in a straightforward 
sense. By contrast with continuous simple motions, however, it is not clear what kind of 
unity we can attribute to an instance of coming to be. Because the equivalence of 
continuity and unity played an important role in establishing the goal-directedness of 
continuous motion, an investigation of unity in coming to be seems in order. The need for 
such an account will be clearer, however, if we first point out what is not included in the 
kind of continuity I have just described. First, although it was drawn from Aristotle’s 
discussions of natural coming to be, the above account of continuity in change does not 
guarantee that the sequence of changes so characterized is directed toward any particular 
outcome. In the case of simple motions, this difficulty is ruled out by the observation that 
a single continuous motion involves only one πράγμα. In the case of coming to be, 
however, even if every change in the sequence can be described separately as the καθ’ 
αύτό effect of some agent, the sequence as a whole may still be a random concatenation. 
Moreover, the fact that such a sequence of changes may include instances of coming to
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be and passing away removes even the continuity that would be present in a progressive 
series of motions undergone by a single subject. In short, what we have so far is only 
sufficient continuity to keep the world as a whole moving: there is no guarantee yet that 
some complex portions of it are going anywhere in particular.
To find this guarantee, however, we need only return to the basic structure of 
goal-directed change that emerged in sections 1-2. As in the case of continuous simple 
motions, what can ensure the continuity of a complex change as a single, goal-directed 
process is its relation to a single agent, aiming at a single outcome. This agent need not 
be the immediate cause of each stage in the process, but it must be responsible for the 
process as a whole. That this is frequently the case, however, Aristotle takes to be 
obvious from the simple fact that complex changes leading to familiar outcomes occur 
repeatedly, in the same or similar circumstances, throughout the world as we know it. As 
already observed, that which happens always or for the most part does not happen by 
spontaneity or chance, that is, κατά συμβεβεκός. Not to happen κατάσυμβεβεκός, of 
course, is to have a καθ’ αυτό agent cause, and the operation of such a cause provides 
grounds for supposing that the final outcome will take place. This means, finally, that the 
process is hypothetically necessary for, and takes place for the sake of, its outcome (see 
Physics II.8, 198b34-199a8). The continuity we are looking for, therefore, is that which 
characterizes a process of this sort.
We are now on familiar territory, and there is no need to explain in detail or to provide 
extensive references to the various arguments by which Aristotle establishes the 
teleological structure of the complex but ordered changes that characterize his cosmos. 
Most or all of these arguments are found in Physics II.8; most or all are found elsewhere 
as well, especially in Parts o f Animals 1.1 and 1.5. Moreover, the first argument from 
Physics II.8 is the argument we have just mentioned concerning what takes place always 
or for the most part. A brief discussion of the second, however, the well-known analogy 
between nature and art, will help us develop the concepts of continuity and unity in 
change that we need to complete our commentary on Physics II.2. It will also help make 
clear what sort of agent we need if a complex change is to have a καθ’ αυτό cause.
In the art analogy (199a8-32), Aristotle points out that many of the changes we 
observe in nature have the characteristic structure of things done for the sake of an end— 
a structure that we have already discerned by observing and experiencing human activity. 
When we set out to make something, for example, the various steps in which we engage 
are cumulative, and cumulative in just such a way that they result in this particular end. 
Their cumulative character is analogous to that of a unified simple motion, although more 
complex changes—we might call them “constructive” rather them “cumulative”— 
typically involve multiple steps that differ from each other in kind. Aristotle’s point in the 
art analogy is that if we know what to look for, we find in nature instances of constructive 
change as diverse as ants working cooperatively to store food for the winter, and plants 
growing to maturity and producing fruit. To make the analogy as forceful as possible, he 
comments that if a house came to be by nature rather than by art, it would nevertheless 
have to be constructed in more or less the same way as it is now. Taking the art analogy 
together with the cumulative character of goal-directed simple motions, we can now 
identify the cumulative or constructive nature of goal-directed change as one of its 
general features.
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However, the analogy between nature and art is not meant to stand alone as an argument 
that natural processes are goal-directed, nor can it do so. In principle, a constructive 
change of the sort Aristotle has in mind might take place spontaneously, in which case it 
would not take place for the sake of an end. Nevertheless, the analogy serves to focus our 
attention on the fact that constructive change is typical of, though it does not necessarily 
imply, goal directed action. Such change, moreover, is the norm rather than the exception 
in nature. Thus the central premise in Aristotle’s first argument, the dichotomy between 
goal-directed change and spontaneity or chance, also provides the context within which 
the art analogy gains its force.
Aside from the art analogy and its place in Aristotle’s arguments, the notion of a 
constructive change and its difference from a merely cumulative change such as heating 
is worth dwelling on. We have already seen the grounds of this difference in the fact that 
a motion like heating has a stable substrate, constituted by material and formal principles 
that remain the same throughout. The change is cumulative in that each degree of heat 
attained disposes the subject to receive a greater degree of heat. As long as the change 
remains a motion, the basic existence of the substance involved is not affected. Coming 
to be, as we have seen, is quite different. Here the change involves the matter and the 
form themselves, so that a new substance comes to be. If we consider the hierarchy of 
matter and form by which Aristotle accounts for various sorts of substances, moreover, 
we can easily see why the notion of constructive change seems so appropriate for coming 
to be. Coming to be always involves producing in appropriate matter a higher, and 
therefore a more determinate, and so in turn a more clearly discernible form.12 In this 
way, each level of actuality builds upon the previous.
The notion of construction turns out to be even more appropriate if we consider that in 
Aristotle’s cosmos, the actuality or form of every natural substance is something 
complex. Even the simplest bodily substances, the elements, have two defining qualities 
each. In the homogeneous bodies composed of these elements, we find a much greater 
variety of active and passive bodily qualities. These in turn make possible a wide array of 
heterogeneous bodies, which display an even greater complexity insofar as they can be 
formed from more than one homogeneous body and are characterized not only by their 
directly perceptible qualities, but by their shape and by the relations of their parts to one 
another. All this, finally, makes possible the complex forms of living things, a complexity 
which Aristotle takes points out at some length in Parts o f Animals 1.2-4 when he argues 
that living substances cannot be defined by dichotomy.
Although the point cannot be discussed thoroughly here, Aristotle also makes it 
clear in De anima and especially in Generation o f Animals that within the complex form 
of a living thing, some capacities are for the sake of others. The best example of this is 
that the perceptual faculty depends for its existence on the nutritive faculty, and the 
nutritive faculty in a given animal must therefore be of the right sort to support its 
perceptual life. Moreover, any serious study of living things reveals an enormous 
complexity of similar relations, a complexity barely hinted at in De anima but 
investigated at great length in the biological works. The production of a living form in 
matter, therefore, is necessarily a complex process in which the most essential aspects of 
the nutritive faculty come to be first, in the parts that serve as their matter. These are 
followed by other parts and other faculties, and so on until the animal reaches maturity
12 This point is particularly clear in Aristotle’s remarkable discussion of matter and form in Mete. IV. 12.
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and is capable of producing another like itself. Here, obviously, the notion of a 
constructive process is fully exemplified.
Before returning to the question of unity in complex processes of coming to be, there is a 
final point to be made about the constructive character of such processes. When we 
considered simple motions like heating, I pointed out that such motions, though 
teleological at a basic level, are relatively weak examples of goal-directed activity. This 
was mainly because of the disconnect that can exist in such cases between the actuality or 
good appropriate to the agent cause of the motion and that appropriate to its subject In 
the worst case, the agent’s self-fulfillment can result in the patient’s destruction. 
Obviously, however, this cannot be the case in coming to be. Here, whether the agency is 
internal or external, the agent of coming to be necessarily—by definition, in fact— 
expresses its nature constructively. This colloquial use of the English “constructive” 
brings out the fact that the outcome of coming to be is, necessarily, the actuality and the 
good both of the agent and of that upon which it acts.
Earlier, in order to pursue the notion of continuity in coming to be, I postponed 
discussion of a text from Physics V.4 according to which a motion can be one in virtue of 
being complete. It is now time to see how continuity and the notion of a constructive 
change can help us approach the notion of completeness, and thus arrive at the unity of 
coming to be. Let us first review the text:
Further, we also call one a motion that is complete, whether in genus, whether in 
species, or whether in ούσία, just as also in other things the complete and the 
whole pertain to what is one. But sometimes an incomplete motion may be called 
one, if only it be continuous (Phys. V.4, 228bl 1-15).
In writing these lines, Aristotle may or may not have been thinking particularly of motion 
in the strict sense. In any case, the point clearly applies to coming to be as well. A change 
is complete, on Aristotle’s account of completeness, when it reaches the limit to which it 
is directed (cf. Metaph. Δ.16, 1021b24-5). In the case of coming to be, this is obviously 
the form of the resulting composite, and what takes place between the starting point of 
the complex change and this final limit is obviously a single process of coming to be. As 
we have already observed, moreover, and will consider further in just a moment, these 
two limits are the boundaries of a constructive process governed by a single agent.13 The 
steps that fall between the limits are therefore continuous with each other in a way in 
which they are not continuous with any changes that fall outside them. Thus for coming 
to be as well as for motion, unity and continuity is this final sense coincide. This sense of 
continuity is, finally, the sense in which continuity guarantees that a process of change, 
whether or not it is a continuous motion in the first sense of Physics V.3-4, takes place 
for the sake of its outcome.
As in the case of simple motions, therefore, the key step in establishing that an 
instance of coming to be is continuous is to show that such coming to be is brought about 
by an agent whose activity is aimed at producing the mature form. Of course, this is not 
always be the case: the subterranean production of various homogeneous bodies is, no 
doubt, largely a matter of chance. Aristotle’s favorite case of natural coming to be, 
however, is the reproduction of living things, and this can easily be distinguished from 
random or partly random processes by applying the criteria developed in Aristotle’s
|J There are actually two agents, but the goal of the first is to produce the active power of the second; see
below.
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discussion of chance ( Phys. II.4-6). Several times in the course of this discussion, 
Aristotle writes that chance events are those that, although they might have come about 
for the sake of an end, in fact have only a accidental cause. Such events unfold, perhaps, 
just as they would by nature or art, but there is no καθ’ αυτό cause of this development. 
As with the continuous and pseudo-continuous motions discussed in section 2, it is the 
presence or absence of a καθ’ αυτό agent that determines whether coming to be takes 
place for an end.
Aristotle holds that apart from the few cases of spontaneous generation, the 
coming to be of living things is always the result of a καθ’ αυτό cause—or rather of two 
such causes, the role of the first being to produce the second. To summarize the account 
found in Generation o f Animals II. 1-4, the agent cause of an animal’s coming to be as a 
distinct substance is the male parent. This parent, either through its own activity directly 
or through the motions it imparts to an instrument, the semen, produces from the material 
supplied by the female a conceptus (κύημα). This conceptus is a relatively 
undifferentiated mass separated by a membrane from the more fluid parts of the 
καταμήνια and thus structurally distinct from the mother. As soon as it exists, the active 
role of the male in the reproductive process is complete: the conceptus already has a 
primitive nutritive soul, and if it receives adequate nutrition can develop to maturity by 
its own agency.
Once the conceptus has come to be, the first internal organ to develop is, Aristotle 
argues, that which is to direct the rest of the process. In sanguineous animals, this is the 
heart, which from the first moment of its existence is the source from which both 
nutriment and the heat required to concoct it come to the various parts of the developing 
animal. He is clear that the temporal priority of the heart in coming to be must be 
understood teleologically: for the process of reproduction to succeed, the parts and 
faculties most essential to the offspring’s existence and development must come to be as 
quickly as possible. The male parent, therefore, produces a distinct substance which has a 
primitive structural integrity through its surrounding membrane, and within which the 
master organ, the source of nutrition and later of perception, is on the point of coming to 
be.
We must, therefore, distinguish two stages in the coming to be of a living thing. In 
the first, the parent or parents produce a new substance distinct from themselves. The 
immediate result of their action is the instantaneous, unqualified coming to be of the 
offspring, its passage from non-being to being. However, this coming to be is incomplete 
in that the form at which it aims has not yet been achieved. The complete process of 
coming to be continues under internal direction by the nutritive faculty, which exists 
primarily in the heart or in an analogous organ. Despite this division into two stages, 
however, coming to be is a single, continuous, and complete process because the first of 
the two agents involved has as its καθ’ αυτό effect the nutritive soul, i.e., the faculty by 
which the coming to be is completed.
V
I have argued that Aristotle considers continuity a sufficient condition of goal- 
directedness for any sort of change. The robust sort of continuity that can play this role, 
however, is that of a single process, directed by a καθ’ αΰτό agent toward an end
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determined by the agent’s nature. The matter in which this end is produced is 
hypothetically necessary for the end, as is each of the stages or steps by which the agent 
brings about the end. In teleological terms, the agent acts for the sake of the form it 
brings about, and the matter in which it produces this form is also—within the causal 
context determined by the agent—hypothetically necessary for the sake of this form.
I shall not attempt here to reflect at any length on the consequences of these conclusions 
for our understanding of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Rather, I shall simply highlight 
one consequence that, if not entirely original, is certainly worth further reflection. If the 
foregoing interpretation of goal-directed change is correct, then Aristotle’s teleology is 
inseparable from his analysis of change and agency. In the study of nature as he 
understands it, therefore, to reject the causal role of ends is in fact to negate all causality, 
and so to posit an utterly random and wholly unintelligible world.
